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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the Second 
District Court, the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presiding, dated 
July 13, 1998. Record (hereinafter "R") at 119. The court 
entered its judgment and order following the trial de novo of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Department of 
Human Services. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. § 35A-
1-502, as applied to Burgandy, did not chill or burden Burgandy's 
due process right to a pretermination hearing and, therefore, was 
constitutional under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's conclusion of law is reviewed for 
correctness. Park City Mines Co. V. Greater Park City Co., 870 
P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); no particular deference is given to a 
trial court's ruling on a question of law. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The ordinary presumption of 
constitutionality of the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. § 
35A-1-502, does not apply, since the right impaired is an 
important constitutionally based personal right, warranting a 
heightened level of review. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 
1365 (Utah App. 1993). See discussion infra, at 12. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article If Section 11 
United States Constitution, Amendments Five and Fourteen 
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case challenges on constitutional grounds the recovery 
of $726, representing General Assistance (GA) paid to Burgandy 
while a decision on his request for a pretermination hearing was 
pending. At the trial level, the parties stipulated to the 
material facts. The only issue considered was Burgandy1s 
argument that the statute, Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502, which 
allows the state of Utah to recover overpayments caused by 
mistake, administrative error or fraud, should not be construed 
as allowing recovery of an overpayment that results from the 
exercise of a pretermination hearing right. Burgandy maintains 
that to allow recovery under these circumstances chills or 
burdens a GA recipient's right of access to the courts, thereby 
violating the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution, 
Article If Section 11. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Burgandy filed his complaint in the second district court on 
June 6, 1997, seeking de novo review of the Findings and Order of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Human 
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Services, issued May 8, 1997. R-5. After stipulating to the 
material facts, the parties briefed the legal issue and appeared 
before the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on December 18, 1997 for 
oral argument. R-96. On March 27, 1998, a memorandum decision 
was issued, affirming the action of the administrative agency. 
R-119. On July 14, 1998, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Judgment and Order were entered. R-125. This appeal 
followed on July 27, 1998. R-144. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The second district court affirmed the agency decision and 
upheld an overpayment of $726.00. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
In May 1994, Burgandy was fifty-six years of age and 
suffering from physical and mental impairments. R-100. At 
that time, he was determined unemployable by the Ogden office of 
the Department of Human Services and began receiving financial 
assistance of $241 per month under the General Assistance 
Program. R-39. On June 7, 1994, while receiving GA benefits, 
Burgandy applied for disability benefits under the federal Social 
Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. R-39. 
On July 21, 1994, Burgandy received notice from the state of 
Utah that he was no longer considered unemployable and his GA 
would terminate July 31, 1994. R-39. At the time he received 
the notice that his GA would be terminated, Burgandy was 
homeless, unable to work and had no savings, assets or other 
means of supporting himself. R-100. Believing that he was 
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unemployable, Burgandy requested a hearing and further requested 
that his GA benefits be continued while his hearing request was 
pending. R-39. Burgandy was advised in the hearing request form 
that: "If the hearing decision supports the agency action and you 
are not successful in any further appeal of that decision, you 
may have an overpayment if you receive continued or reinstated 
benefits. You will have to pay back any overpayment." R-43. 
Burgandy's benefits continued through the month of his hearing 
decision, October 1994. R-39, 51. 
On August 16, 1994, a hearing was held and Burgandy appeared 
and testified. R-39. On October 6, 1994, the hearing officer 
issued a decision upholding the closure of Burgandy1s GA case. 
R-39. Burgandy requested review of that decision. R-40. 
Burgandy subsequently reapplied for GAf was found eligible and 
continued to receive benefits until his Social Security 
disability was established. R-101. 
On April 1, 1995, the state of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services served Burgandy with a Notice of Agency Action: 
Overpayment Determination (NAA:OD), alleging an overpayment of 
$726.00, representing the GA benefits paid to him while his 
hearing was pending. R-40, 51. On April 6, 1995, Burgandy 
requested a hearing on the alleged overpayment. R-40. The 
parties subsequently stipulated to hold the hearing in abeyance, 
pending a decision on Burgandy's appeal of the fair hearing 
decision. R-40. 
On July 20, 1995, the Social Security Administration found 
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Burgandy disabled since September 1993 and awarded him benefits 
under the SSDI and SSI programs. R-40. 
On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings affirmed the fair hearing decision which 
had found Burgandy ineligible for GA benefits. R-40, 60. 
Burgandy did not seek further review of this decision. 
On March 10f 1997f a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on the alleged GA overpayment. R-41. On 
May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision 
upholding the overpayment but declining to consider Burgandy's 
argument that recovery of the overpayment was constitutionally 
barred. R-41, 68. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Burgandy's right to a pretermination hearing is a 
fundamental right under the federal constitution, entitled to the 
highest protection. That right is infringed by the state's 
reliance on Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502 to recover the amount of 
GA benefits paid to Burgandy while his request for a hearing was 
pending. The threat of recovery of an overpayment under these 
circumstances chills or burdens Burgandy's right to a due process 
hearing and is, therefore, violative of the open courts 
provision, Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. The 
court should apply a heightened level of review and find the 
statute as applied unconstitutional. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. General Assistance and The Recovery of Overpayments 
General Assistance is a state-funded program which provides 
benefits to unemployable persons who are ineligible for cash 
assistance under other state or federal programs. Utah Code 
Annot. § 35A-3-401. GA is typically paid to those Utahns who are 
temporarily unemployable or who are awaiting a determination of 
eligibility for federal SSI disability benefits. Standards for 
determining unemployability are established by the Department of 
Workforce Services, previously known as the Department of Human 
Services. At the time this case arose, a claimant for GA was 
required to have a physical or mental impairment, expected to 
last 30 days, and: 
so severe that the person cannot do his 
previous work. In addition, he could not 
reasonably hope to find any other kind of 
"substantial work1 considering his age, 
education and work experience. "Substantial 
work1 is work which pays $500 or more a 
month. 
UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 362-4. See Addendum. 
The same state policies establishing the standard for GA 
provide that the claimant "has a legal right to ask for a hearing 
any time he does not agree with an action on his case." UTAH-
DHS-OFS Vol. II § 190. The policy goes on to direct the 
caseworker, in cases wherein a recipient is entitled to advance 
notice, to "continue the financial assistance if the client asked 
for the hearing anytime before the effective date of the action 
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or within 10 days of the notice mail date." Id., at § 190-2. 
The policy specifically provides that lf[t]he client is not 
entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal of the 
initial hearing decision." Jd. See Addendum. 
The same policies give direction regarding the assessment of 
overpayments for incorrect payments. UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 840. 
The policy divides incorrect payments into three categories: 
1. Administrative error—mistakes made by 
state or local office staff in computing 
payments or eligibility; 
2. Inadvertent error—mistakes made by the 
client or his representative that are not 
intended; and 
3. Intentional violation—deliberate 
breaches of program rules by the client or 
his representative. 
See Addendum. The policy makes no reference to incorrect 
payments resulting from continued assistance while a hearing is 
pending. 
The recovery of GA benefits paid during the pendency of a 
hearing request is not the typical overpayment contemplated by 
state policy. The Notice of Agency Action served on Burgandy to 
notify him of the state's intent to recover an overpayment 
references only the three traditional types of incorrect payments 
identified in state policy. It alleges, in part: 
The State of Utah is entitled to recover all 
overpayments of public assistance whether due 
to fraud, mistake, or administrative error 
under Sections 62A-9-129 and 62A-11-201 et 
seq., U.C.A. 1953. (emphasis added) 
R-51. Neverthelessf the term "overpayment" is defined broadly 
7 
enough by state statute to include the GA benefits paid to 
Burgandy pending his hearing. Section 62A-9-129, which has been 
redesignated as Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502, provides: 
"Overpayment1 means money, public assistance, 
or any other thing of value provided under a 
state or federally funded benefit program to 
the extent that the person receiving the 
thing of value is not entitled to receive it 
or is not entitled to receive it at the level 
provided. 
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502(1)(b)(i). Further: 
Each providerf client, or other person 
who receives an overpayment shall, regardless 
of fault, return the overpayment or repay its 
value to the department immediately... 
Utah Code Annot. § 35A-1-502(2). The Administrative Law Judge 
who heard Burgandy1s case also found that the federal regulations 
at 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4)(i)(B) had been incorporated into the 
GA policiesf thereby establishing a further category of 
overpayment. R-69. The language of the statute is broad enough 
to encompass an overpayment that accrues during the pendency of a 
hearing; nevertheless, it appears safe to say that neither the 
legislature nor the Department of Human Services ever considered 
whether the statute so applied might infringe on a GA recipient's 
constitutional rights. 
II. RECOVERY OF AN OVERPAYMENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE IS BARRED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
A. A GA Recipient's Right to a Pretermination Hearing Is a 
Fundamental Right Entitled To The Highest Protection 
The state's action of recovering GA paid to a recipient 
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while a hearing determination is pending implicates a fundamental 
right: the right of a GA recipient to a pretermination hearing, A 
fundamental right does not mean a right of particular human or 
social significance. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguezf 
411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973). A 
fundamental right has its source, explicitly or implicitly, in 
the Constitution. Plyler v. Doer 457 U.S. 202, 217, n. 15, 102 
S.Ct. 2382, 2395, n. 15, 72 L.Ed. 2d 786 (1982). 
Almost thirty years ago in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
261, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970), the Supreme Court 
held due process required that recipients of state-funded general 
assistance be given an evidentiary hearing before termination of 
their welfare benefits. The state of Utah does not question this 
fundamental right. Its policies and procedures presume the right 
of a GA recipient to a due process hearing before benefits may be 
terminated. 
The fundamental right of a GA recipient to a due process 
pretermination hearing is entitled to the highest protection, 
since it directly affects access to the courts. The United 
States Supreme Court has described the right of access to the 
courts as "one aspect of the right of petition." California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 
S.Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.Ed. 2d 642 (1972). The Court has described 
the right to petition as "among the most precious of the 
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights." United Mine 
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88 
9 
S.Ct. 353, 356, 19 L.Ed. 2d 426 (1967). 
B. The Open Courts Provision 
Access to the courts is so highly regarded that the framers 
of the Utah Constitution preserved it with the following 
language: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. Such a provision, 
often referred to as an "open courts" clause or "remedies" 
clause, is found in thirty-seven state constitutions. Berry By 
And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 
1985). The Kansas Supreme Court described its open courts 
provision as "one of the most sacred and essential constitutional 
guarantees." State ex. rel. Stephen v. O'Keefe, 686 P.2d 171, 
178 (Kan. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984). 
The right of access to the courts applies also to 
administrative proceedings, including commissions, boards and 
bureaus. State ex. rel. Stephen v. O'Keefe, 686 P.2d at 178. 
A GA recipient's access to the courts begins at the 
administrative level, since administrative remedies must first be 
exhausted before review in district court may be sought. Utah 
Code Annot. § 63-46b-15. 
A GA recipient's right of access to the courts is not 
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affected when the state exercises the authority of the statute to 
recover a typical overpayment caused by fraud, mistake or 
administrative error; such proceedings are not questioned by this 
appeal. Overpayments caused by fraud, mistake or administrative 
error do occur and the statute in question, Utah Code Annot. § 
35A-1-502, represents a proper function of the legislative branch 
of government to recover them. It is the chilling effect on a GA 
recipient's right to a pretermination hearing by the threatened 
use of the statute to recover benefits paid while the hearing is 
pending that is the concern of this appeal. 
The open courts provision should be applied broadly so as to 
prevent such a chilling effect. A consistent line of Supreme 
Court holdings supports this position. Thus, the Court in Berry 
declared: 
A plain reading of section 11 also 
establishes that the framers of the 
Constitution intended that an individual 
could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights. A constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courthouse was not 
intended by the founders to be an empty 
gesture; individuals are also entitled to a 
remedy by "due course of law' for injuries to 
"person, property, or reputation.' 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 675. 
Utah appellate decisions support the argument that GA 
recipients are especially entitled to protection under the open 
courts provision. The Supreme Court in Berry observed that while 
the legislature has great latitude in defining, changing and 
modernizing the law: 
11 
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of Article 
I, section 11 is to impose some limitation 
on that power for the benefit of those 
persons who are injured in their persons, 
property, or reputations since they are 
generally isolated in society, belong to no 
identifiable group, and rarely are able to 
rally the political process to their aid. 
Berryf 717 P.2d at 676. Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring 
opinion in Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 367 
(Utah 1989) reiterated the Court's view that Article I, Section 
11 protects the rights of citizens unable to obtain a remedy 
through the normal political process. This court, in Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361, held the right to petition for habeus 
corpus to be "a basic individual right and prisoners constitute a 
group needing protection because they are isolated in society and 
lack political influence." 
There can be little argument that GA recipients are a 
similarly situated group of citizens, generally isolated in 
society, and lacking the ability to pursue a remedy through the 
normal political process. At the time he requested a hearing and 
continuing benefits, Burgandy was disabled, homeless and lacking 
both income and resources. R-100. As a group, GA recipients fit 
the definition of citizens whose claims for relief merit review 
under the open courts provision. 
C. A Heightened Level of Review Is Appropriate 
Analysis of the challenged statute should be made utilizing 
a heightened standard of review. While generally a statute is 
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity, this court 
has held that when a civil remedy protected under Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is involved, the usual 
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presumption of validity does not control. Currier v. Holden, 862 
P.2d at 1362. The court noted that a majority of the Utah 
Supreme Court had agreed in Condemarin that a heightened level of 
review was implicated but felt compelled by an analytical 
disagreement among the justices to examine two additional 
criteria: (1) the degree to which a statute impairs an 
individual's right to seek remedy, and (2) the nature of the 
right impaired. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1362-63. 
Case law supports the conclusion that the degree of 
impairment need be very little, when the right affected is 
something as sacred as access to the courts. In Silver v. 
Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976) the court, in analyzing 
the right of access to the courts under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution, held that the 
degree of impairment need be very slight to constitute a 
violation of a person's civil rights. The plaintiffs in Silver 
brought suit against an urban renewal authority relocation 
officer who threatened to withhold $10,000 in money owing to 
plaintiffs, should they file a lawsuit to challenge the fairness 
of a property sale. In finding that plaintiffs had a valid 
claim, the court held: 
Defendant contends that a threat to 
withhold legally required payments if a 
person exercises his right of access to the 
courts does not constitute a violation of 
constitutional rights and thus the court 
erred in not granting his motion to dismiss 
this action. Access to the courts of the 
United States is a constitutional right 
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments. (citations 
omitted) This right of access to the courts 
cannot be infringed upon or burdened. Adams 
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v, Carlson, 7 Cir., 488 F.2d 619, 630. A 
public official's threats to a citizen to 
withhold monies due and owing, should legal 
proceedings on an independent matter be 
instituted, burdens or chills constitutional 
rights of access to the courts. And this is 
true although the threat is not actually 
effective. 
Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d at 163. By analogy to this case, a 
threat to a GA recipient to recover continued benefits as an 
overpayment is a significant burden or chilling of a 
constitutional right, even though the GA recipient is undeterred 
by the threat and requests a hearing. 
The fact that the denial of Burgandy's GA benefits was 
upheld after administrative review (R-60) does not diminish the 
degree of impairment. Relying on Silver v. Cormierr the court in 
McCoy v. Golden, 598 F.Supp. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) held that 
mechanics were denied their right of access to the courts by an 
agreement which required recoupment of a portion of wages 
previously paid and a waiver of their right to litigate the terms 
of the agreement. The court opined: 
Contrary to defendants' assertion, plaintiff 
need not prove that plaintiffs had a right to 
the 1978-1982 wage rates or back pay set 
forth in the April 1982 wage agreement in 
order to claim that their right to access was 
unduly burdened. v[E]ven though a person has 
no "right' to a valuable government benefit 
and even though the government may deny him 
the benefit for any number of reasons, there 
are some reasons upon which the government 
may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a 
person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests ....' 
Perry v. Sindermann. 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 
S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed. 2d 570 (1972). 
Thus, the fact that plaintiffs were not 
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"entitled to the benefits does not in and of 
itself defeat their constitutional claim. 
See Northern Pennsylvania Legal Svcs., Inc. 
V. County of Lackawanaf 513 F.Supp. 678 
(M.D.Pa. 1981). 
McCoy v. Goldinf 598 F.Supp. at 315. Applying this reasoning to 
Burgandy's case, the state may not deny him GA benefits while his 
request for a hearing is pending, if doing so infringes on his 
protected constitutional right to a pretermination hearing. The 
fact that he might not be entitled to the benefits is not 
determinative. 
The degree of impairment of the right in question need not 
be total, for a statute to receive heightened review under the 
open courts provision. The statutes reviewed by this court in 
Currier and the Supreme Court in Berry did not cut off causes of 
action entirely, but did impose significant limitations. 
Similarly, in this case, the right to a pretermination hearing is 
not eliminated but is impaired to a significant degree. The 
trial court acknowledges that the statute, interpreted to permit 
recovery of all overpayments incurred while a hearing is pending, 
does deter some GA recipients from requesting a hearing. The 
trial court reasoned: 
If the petitioner where [sic] to prevail in 
his arguments all general assistance 
recipients who received notice to terminate 
their assistance, whether or not they felt 
they were wronged would be inclined to 
immediately access the courts, first through 
an administrative hearing, knowing that their 
assistance would continue during that hearing 
process. 
R-120. Implicit in the court's reasoning is the assumption that 
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the statute does chill the right of some GA recipients to a due 
process hearing. Since there is no means of determining merit 
prior to a pretermination hearing, the chilling effect likely 
impedes access to the courts by both meritorious and 
nonmeritorious claimants. The United States Supreme Court in 
Goldberg v. Kelly did not distinguish between recipients with 
meritorious cases and those without. The deterrence of even a 
small number of GA recipients is a sufficient degree of 
impairment for satisfying the first criteria identified in 
Currier. 
The court in Currier does not say whether equal weight 
should be given to each criteriaf or whether the degree of 
impairment might be less in some cases, depending upon the nature 
of the right affected. It is reasonable to conclude that the two 
criteria must be considered together, with a lesser degree of 
impairment required, when an important individual right is at 
stake. Under such an approach, stricter scrutiny would be given 
when a basic individual right, such as a right found in the 
federal constitution, is impaired than, for example, when 
impairment of a commercial right is involved. 
The conclusion that the court should employ a heightened 
level of review is strengthened by consideration of the nature of 
the right impaired. In Currier, the court noted that 
"[g]enerally, "a court will exercise stricter scrutiny in 
evaluating measures that encroach upon civil liberties than it 
will with respect to statutes that impact what can be 
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characterized as only economic interests. "' Currier, 862 P.2d at 
1364 quoting In re Criminal Investigationf 7th Dist. Ct.f 754 
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)(citing Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 
57, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (1941)(Wolfe,J., concurring)). The court 
observed that the Utah Supreme Court has reached a similar 
conclusion that legislation impairing rights specifically 
protected by the federal constitution requires a higher level of 
review. Currier, 862 P.2d at 1364. The court in Currier 
concluded that a statute impairing the right to petition for 
habeus corpus required the application of heightened scrutiny 
when analyzed under the open courts provision. 
The appeal in this case also involves a right protected 
under the federal constitution—the right to a pretermination 
hearing. It is a highly valuable right for GA recipients, since 
they are often wholly dependent on meager benefits to meet the 
cost of surviving. Receiving GA benefits, without interruption, 
while trying to establish SSI eligibility can mean the difference 
between homelessness and continued residence in some type of 
housing; it can be the difference between having food at the end 
of the month when Food Stamps run out and going hungry; it can 
mean the difference between medical treatment and going without. 
The nature of the right impaired by the statute as applied 
compels a heightened level of scrutiny in this appeal. The 
reasoning in Silver v. Cormier can be readily applied by analogy 
to this case. The threat of having to pay back benefits is as 
real a burden on a GA recipient's civil rights as the threat to 
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withhold payment of money. The right of access to the courts, 
whether it be analyzed under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution or under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitutionf is of the highest order; any 
impairment thereof deserves the highest level of review. See 
Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of N.M., 918 P.2d 1321, 1331 (N.M. 
1996)(Strict scrutiny is applied, when the right sought to be 
vindicated by access to the courts is a fundamental right). 
D. The Statute Fails The Berry Reasonableness Test 
Review of a statute under the open courts provision is a 
balanced analysis, involving a consideration of reasonable 
remedies for wrongs suffered. Thus, the Court in Berry declared: 
We hold that section 11 of the 
Declaration of Rights and the prerogative of 
the legislature are properly accommodated by 
applying a two-part analysis. First, section 
11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy "by the course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. 
The benefit provided by the substitute must 
be substantially equal in value or other 
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing 
essentially comparable substantive protection 
to one's person, property or reputation, 
although the form of the substitute remedy 
may be different. (citations omitted) 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
There is no adequate substitute for a pretermination 
hearing, when a person is receiving GA benefits. It is only 
through a hearing before an impartial hearing officer that a GA 
recipient can hope to have his rights properly determined. There 
is no other provision in the law for determining a GA recipient's 
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rights to benefits. Moreover, a hearing is the recipient's 
entrance to the court system. 
The Court went on to hold: 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective, (citations omitted) 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. 
There is no clear social or economic evil that must be 
eliminated by the statute at issue in this appeal. The statute 
serves its purpose by authorizing the recovery of overpayments 
caused by administrative error, mistake or fraud. Clearly, a 
proper social good is served by recovering overpayments resulting 
from such causes. But a distinction has to be made when the 
overpayment results from the exercise of an important individual 
right. Rather than eliminating a social evil, the statute, when 
interpreted to include the type of ovepayment at issue in this 
appeal, creates its own evil by chilling a GA recipient's right 
to a hearing. 
There is no clear economic evil to be eliminated by 
interpreting the statute to allow recovery of the type of 
ovepayment Burgandy incurred. The number of GA recipients is 
small and the number who request pretermination hearings with 
continued benefits even smaller. The period of time during which 
continued benefits are paid is usually short, since a hearing is 
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normally held within a few weeks of being requested. The time 
periods and amount of benefits paid in Burgandy's case are 
typical. Burgandy requested a hearing on August lf 1994 and 
received a hearing on August 16th. A decision was issued October 
6, 1994, resulting in a three-month overpayment of $726.00. 
As discussed previously, the only objective identified by 
the trial court for justifying application of the statute to 
allow recovery of benefits received by GA recipients while a 
hearing is pending is that it will deter those lacking 
meritorious cases. The unreasonableness and arbitrariness of 
this objective inheres in the fact that there is no mechanism 
for determining which GA recipients have good cases, and should 
be continued on GA, and which deserve to be terminated. The 
only fair way such a determination can be made is by permitting 
a hearing. However, the unrepresented, uneducated GA recipient 
is not capable of making an accurate assessment of the merits of 
his case and may choose to forego a hearing, rather than take 
the chance of having to repay what for him is a sizable 
overpayment. 
If deterring frivolous appeals is the state's objective, an 
alternative exists for making that objective more reasonable. 
The hearing officer who renders the decision after the 
pretermination hearing could simply include a finding whether 
the person requesting a hearing did so in good faith and with 
reasonable probability of success. If a finding is made that 
the appeal lacked merit or was brought in bad faith, then the 
20 
state would be free to pursue recovery of an overpayment. 
The concept underlying this more reasonable alternative has 
a solid basis in law. The Social Security Act ameliorates some 
of the harshness of overpayment recovery by allowing waiver of 
the overpayment, when it is shown that the recipient was not at 
fault in causing the overpayment and recovery would defeat the 
purpose of the Social Security Act or be against equity and good 
conscience. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(b)(B); 404(b); 20 C.F.R. §§ 
416.550 et. seq.. Under this authority, the Social Security 
Administration has waived overpayments incurred by SSI 
recipients while a pretermination hearing was pending. 
In the case of Arthur Va (May 21, 1979), the Social 
Security Administration Appeals Council reversed an 
Administrative Law Judge who had found Va at fault in causing 
his overpayment. See Addendum. Va had been receiving SSI in 
November 1975 when he received notice that his benefits would 
end in January 1976. Va appealed and received continued 
benefits while his appeal was pending. Va's cessation of 
benefits was upheld and he did not seek further review. Va then 
received notice of a $5139.50 overpayment. Va's request for a 
waiver was denied by an ALJ who reasoned Va knew he might have 
to repay the benefits, if he lost the appeal and, irrespective 
of his own opinion about his disability, knew he was receiving 
benefits under the risk of repayment. In reversing the ALJ and 
granting the waiver, the Appeals Council stated: 
[W]here an overpayment occurs as the result 
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of the continuation of payment provisions of 
section 416.1336(c), a finding of without 
fault may still be made if there is no 
evidence establishing that the recipient did 
not believe he properly deserved the 
incorrect payment. The mere fact that a 
claimant signed a statement acknowledging 
possible liability for overpayment would not 
be dispositive of the issue. 
In the instant case, the entire overpayment 
resulted from the continuation of payment 
provisions exercised by the claimant as his 
due process right under the regulations. 
Although the claimant may well have 
understood that the Administration no longer 
considered him disabled and that he could 
ultimately lose on appeal, it is evident 
from the record that he honestly believed he 
was disabled and properly deserved the 
payments made after January 1976. 
Therefore, the mere fact that a claimant 
realizes he received an adverse disability 
determination and that he might ultimately 
lose his appeal and be overpaid is not 
determinative of the without fault issue. 
The key factor is the claimant's belief that 
he was disabled and that he properly 
deserved the payment. 
In the case of Arthur Vaf at 3. See also, In the case of Billie 
J. Wright (March 16, 1979). Addendum. 
The principle that only those who pursue a legal remedy in 
bad faith deserve sanction is found elsewhere in the civil law. 
Courts may award attorney fees against a litigant when the 
action brought was "without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith..." Utah Code Annot. § 78-27-56 (1988). Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to sanction an 
attorney or unrepresented party for making a frivolous claim. 
The same is true under the federal rules, at both the trial and 
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appellate levels. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Fed R. App. P. 38. Under 
the Equal Access to Justice Actf the government may be required 
to pay the prevailing party's fees and costs, unless its 
position was substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1985). 
Case law from the state of Washington further illustrates 
this principle. In Carter v. The University of Washingtonf 536 
P.2d 618 (Wash. 1975), the Court reviewed a statute requiring 
the posting of an appeal bond for review of an administrative 
decision. The Court observed that bond requirements are 
"fraught with the same defect as are filing fees, viz., they 
deter the pursuit of meritorious claims in the appellate 
courts." .Id., at 624. Less onerous methods are available, the 
Court concluded, including a showing of "(1) bona fide indigency 
and (2) probable merit to the claim." Idw a t 624. 
This review demonstrates that reasonable methods for 
distinguishing between meritorious and frivolous claims can be 
crafted. Other institutions have done so in the interest of 
fairness to individuals who choose to exercise their due process 
rights. The fact that the Social Security Administration, one 
of the largest public welfare institutions in the world, has 
deemed it appropriate to sanction only bad faith appellants 
lends credibility to the argument that Utah's recovery of 
overpayments from all GA appellants, regardless of merit, is 
inherently unreasonable. 
Under this suggested approach, Burgandy's appeal was 
brought in good faith. At the time he requested a 
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pretermination hearing, Burgandy believed he was disabled and 
entitled to GA benefits. R-101. Shortly after his hearing 
decision was issued, Burgandy reapplied and was again found 
eligible for GA. R-101. The Social Security Administration, 
using a disability standard more stringent than that applied in 
GA cases1, found Burgandy eligible for disability back to 1993. 
R-40. The fact that Burgandy was advised when he requested a 
hearing that, in the event he was unsuccessful, he might have an 
overpayment is not determinative. The determinative issue is 
whether he requested review in good faith, believing himself to 
still be eligible for GA. Given the facts established, the more 
reasonable policy outlined above would have directed the state 
to decline recovery of an overpayment in Burgandy's case. 
State officials may not take retaliatory action against a 
person in a way which intimidates or chills that person's right 
to exercise a constitutional right to seek judicial relief. 
Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Com'nf 780 F.2d 1422, 1427 
(8th Cir. 1986). Burgandy does not argue that the state's 
action in this case was retaliatory but the effect is the same. 
The possibility of having to repay GA benefits effectively 
chills or intimidates some of Utah's most vulnerable citizens 
from exercising a fundamental right. That effect can only be 
lrThe definition of disability for SSI and Disability Insurance purposes includes a 
requirement that the disabling condition have lasted or be expected to last twelve months or end 
in death. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; 416.905 (1998). The GA standard only requires that the 
condition causing unemployability be expected to last thirty days. UTAH-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 
362-4. See Addendum. 
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eliminated by finding Section 35A-1-502 unconstitutional as 
applied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed hereinf the court should reverse 
the trial court's decision. The court should direct that 
summary judgment be entered in favor of Burgandy and that the 
administrative decision awarding an overpayment of $726.00 be 
reversed. .j 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c> / ' day of November, 1998. 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
T. TRON BURGUNDY, 
a.k.a. Ronald G. Smith, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin 
Case No. 970903742 AA 
m ^  * 
For purpose of the ruling in this matter, the court accepts the stipulated facts as set out in 
the trial memorandum and will not recite them in this opinion. Further, the court recognizes the 
substantial amount of briefing by the parties in preparing exceptional memorandum for the court. 
The court has reviewed in detail the cites and memorandum, but in an attempt to render a 
decision timely, the court will forgo reciting the specific cases, acknowledging that the findings 
and conclusions are reached from its determination of the applicable law cited by the parties. 
The issue before this court is whether the statute allowing recovery of overpayments for 
financial assistance is unconstitutional as it applies to the petitioner who was paid general 
assistance benefits during the pendency of his request for an administrative hearing. 
Its clear that the petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate his benefits, that he 
requested a hearing and elected to have the general assistance continue until after there was a 
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hearing decision. He was aware that if the decision after hearing was against him, that he would 
subsequently be responsible for the overpayment. 
It is clear that financial impediment to access to the courts are disfavored. Cases 
involving filing fees and costs have been found to violate due process. Petitioner argues that a 
chilling effect has taken place because of the required overpayment he is required to repay in 
accordance with the state statues. The law as it stands rehires the re-payment of the general 
assistance paid to the petitioner during the hearing process if he is unsuccessful at his hearing. 
Petitioner argues that to require him to reimburse the state discourages petitioner and others in 
his position from pursuing an appeal and create a barrier to his right to access the courts. 
This court disagrees. There is no chilling effect on the right to access the courts nor a 
barrier. If the petitioner where to prevail in his arguments all general assistance recipients who 
received notice to terminate their assistance, whether or not they felt they were wronged would 
be inclined to immediately access the courts, first through an administrative hearing, knowing 
that their assistance would continue during that hearing process. Petitioner clearly has the right 
to access and can keep his assistance or access without continuing his assistance. There need not 
be a guarantee of his desired outcome from the hearing. His right to due process is not inhibited 
but actually encouraged. Petitioner has the opportunity to contest his termination. If he is 
unsuccessful and has elected to continues general assistance as he did in this case, then by 
statute, which this court concludes is constitutional, he is require to repay those funds received. 
In the opinion of this court the case law supports this conclusion. 
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*ow 
This court grants summary judgment to the respondent and requires the payment by the 
petitioner of sum of $726.00 of general assistance monies he elected to receive from August 
through October 1994 when he requested a fair hear on the decision to terminate and elected to 
receive benefits during the pendency of his initial appeal. The agency action is affirmed. The 
attorney for the respondent is to prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions and judgments. 
DATED this £ 5 day of March, 1998. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing decision was mailed, first-
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald ) 
G. Smith ) 
Petitioner, \ 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department 
of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER 
1 Case No. 970903742AA 
) Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on 
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of 
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human 
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997. The 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided. Tne petitioner, T. Tron 
Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson. The Respondent 
State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
The Court having reviewed the file, heard arguments made by 
the parties, and having fully considered the record in this 
matter, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of Law, 
HEREBY ORDERS THAT: 
The final agency decision issued on May 8, 1997 is affirmed. 
Petitioner's right to access the courts was not violated. A 
judgment is entered in favor of the the State of Utah, Office of 
Recovery Services and against Petitioner for $726.00 for an 
overpayment of general assistance during the time period he was 
ineligible to receive that assistance from August 1994 to 
October, 1994. Said judgment shall accrue at the judgment rate 
of interest. 
DATED this \1 day of \|^ M ^— . 1998. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (#1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor 
P.O. Box 140835 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0835 
Telephone: (801) 536-8358 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald 
G. Smith 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department 
of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 970903742AA 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on 
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of 
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human 
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997. The 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided. The petitioner, T. Tron 
Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson. The Respondent 
State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant 
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Attorney General. At the hearing, the Court accepted the 
Stipulation of Material Facts executed and filed by the parties. 
Petitioner submitted an Affidavit with his Reply to Trial Brief 
filed with the permission of the court after the trial. 
The Court having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of 
the parties and having fully considered the record in this matter 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Pursuant to the stipulation of material facts submitted by 
the parties, the court finds that: 
1. Petitioner T. Tron Burgundy began receiving General 
Welfare Assistance (GA) from the State of Utah in May, 1994, 
based upon a determination that he was unemployable. 
2. On June, 7, 1994, while receiving GA benefits, 
Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the federal 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) programs. 
3. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner received notice from the 
Ogden Office of Family Support that he was no longer considered 
unemployable and that his GA would terminate on July 31, 1994. 
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4. On or about August 1, 1994, Petitioner requested a Fair 
Hearing on the decision to terminate his benefits and he 
requested that his GA benefits continue while his hearing request 
was pending. 
5. On August 16, 1994, Petitioner's case was heard before 
Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson. At this hearing, Petitioner 
had the opportunity to submit evidence, question and call 
witnesses, present argument, and be represented by counsel. 
6. On October 6, 1994, the Fair Hearing Officer issued a 
decision sustaining the closure of Petitioner's GA case. 
7. Petitioner requested a review of the Fair Hearing 
Officer's decision. 
8. On or about January 6, 1995, the Director of the 
Office of Administrative Hearing closed the record of review on 
the Fair Hearing decision after receiving memoranda from all 
parties. 
9. On April 1, 1995, the Office cf Recovery Services 
served a Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination 
(NAA:OD) on Petitioner, alleging an overpayment in the amount of 
$726.00 for GA benefits paid while his Fair Hearing decision was 
pending. 
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10. Petitioner timely requested a review of this agency 
action on April 6, 1995. However, that hearing was stayed until 
the final agency action on the eligibility appeal was rendered. 
11. On July 20, 1995, Petitioner was found by the Social 
Security Administration to be disabled under the SSDI and SSI 
programs, with the disability commencing in September, 1993. 
12. On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings affirmed the Fair Hearing Officer's 
eligibility decision finding petitioner not eligible for GA 
benefits. Petitioner did not appeal this eligibility decision. 
13. On March 10, 1997, a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on the overpayment alleged in the 
NAA:OD. 
14. On May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued 
her final agency decision on the overpayment determination. 
As allowed by the court the following facts were submitted 
to the court in Petitioner's Affidavit attached to his Response 
to Defendant's Trial Brief: 
15. In July 1994, Petitioner was 56 years of age and was 
suffering from physical and mental impairments. 
16. When he received a notice of termination of GA 
4 
benefits, petitioner was homeless, unable to work and had no 
savings, assets or other means of support himself. 
17. At the time Petitioner requested a hearing on the 
termination of his GA assistance, he believed he was entitled to 
GA because he was disabled. 
18. Several months after being terminated from GA benefits, 
petitioner reapplied for those benefits and was found eligible to 
receive them. 
19. He continued to receive them until he became eligible 
for Social Security Disability benefits. 
Pursuant to the evidence presented at trial, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 
20. Petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate 
his GA benefits. 
21. Petitioner requested a Fair Hearing on the decision 
terminating his benefits. 
22. Petitioner elected to continue receiving GA until 
after a decision was issued on the Fair Hearing. 
23. Petitioner was aware that if the decision from the 
Fair Hearing was against him, he would subsequently be 
responsible for the overpayment. 
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Based on the above findings of fact, the Court* now makes its 
conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The law requires the petitioner to repay the GA 
benefits he received during the Fair Hearing hearing process if 
he is unsuccessful at his hearing. See 45 C.F.R. 
§205.10(a)(4)(I)(B), Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-129 and Rule 844-
4(2)(A), Volume II of the Department of Human Services, Office of 
Family Support (UTAH-D.H.S.-0.F.S., Vol. II). 
2. This law is not unconstitutional. 
3. Requiring Petitioner to repay any GA he received 
during a period of ineligibility has no chilling effect on his 
right to access to the court. 
4. The State has erected no barrier which caused 
Petitioner to lose his right to access the court. 
5. The right to access does not guarantee Petitioner that 
he will prevail. 
6. Petitioner has the right to access the courts whether 
or not he continues to receive GA during the hearing process. 
7. Petitioner's right to due process was not inhibited 
6 
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because he was able to exercise all of his procedural rights by 
contesting the termination of his benefits. 
8. If Petitioner unsuccessfully contests his termination 
of benefits and he elected to continue receiving GA during the 
hearing process, then he is required to repay any general 
assistance he received while ineligible from August, 1994 to 
October, 1994. 
9. The final agency decision should be affirmed. 
10. Petitioner should pay to the State $726.00 for 
general assistance he received during his period of ineligibilit 
DATED this 13> day of C L U J ^ T ^ , 1998. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGr 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
-*7x . i 
'? 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 660 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
na ture and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no war ran t shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. i8% 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the mat ter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in t ime of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason denned — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
417 UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE 35A-1-502 
^udication, narrow issues, and simplify the methods of proof 
a t hearings 
(3) Any rule made concerning proceedings before the 
Workforce Appeals Board shall be made m consultation with 
^ e Workforce Appeals Board 1996 
35A'l-304. R e v i e w authority of the Workforce Appeals 
Board. 
(1) (a) In accordance with this title and Title 63A, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, the Workforce Ap-
peals Board may allow an appeal from a decision of an 
administrative law judge if a motion for review is filed 
with the Division of Adjudication within the designated 
time by any party entitled to the notice of the adminis-
trative law judge's decision 
(b) An appeal filed by the party shall be allowed as of 
right if the decision of the administrative law judge did 
not affirm the department's prior decision 
(c) If the Workforce Appeals Board denies an applica-
tion for appeal from the decision of an administrative law 
judge, the decision of the administrative law judge is 
considered a decision of the Workforce Appeals Board for 
purposes of judicial review and is subject to judicial 
review if further appeal is initiated under this title 
(2) On appeal, the Workforce Appeals Board may on the 
basis of the evidence previously submitted m the case, or upon 
the basis of any additional evidence it requires 
(a) affirm the decision of the administrative law judge, 
(b) modify the decision of the administrative law judge, 
or 
(c) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of the 
administrative law judge 
(3) The Workforce Appeals Board shall promptly notify the 
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including 
its findings and conclusions, and the decision is a final order of 
the department unless within 30 days after the date the 
decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, further 
appeal is initiated under this title 1998 
35A-1-305. Independence of Workforce Appeals Board. 
A member of the Workforce Appeals Board may not partici-
pate in any case in which the member is an interested party 
Each decision of a member of the Workforce Appeals Board 
shall represent the member's independent judgment 1997 
35A-1-306. Electronic or similar methods. 
The department may by rule permit hearings or other 
adjudicative hearings to be conducted, recorded, or published 
by means of electronic devices or other similar methods 1996 
35A-1-307. Scope of part. 
This part does not apply to adjudication under 
(1) Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, or 
(2) Chapter 5, Par t 1, Job Training Coordination Act 
1997 
PART 4 
RESERVED 
PART 5 
ASSISTANCE FRAUD 
35A-1-501. Legal representat ion of department. 
At the request of the department, it is the duty of the county 
attorney or district attorney, as appropriate under Sections 
17-18-1, 17-18-1 5, and 17-18-1 7, and the attorney general to 
represent the department in any legal action taken under 
Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, or under Title 76 
Chapter 8, Par t 12, Public Assistance Fraud 1997 
35A-1-502. Civil l iabil ity for overpayment . 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the 
same as those terms are defined m Section 76-2-103 
(b) (1) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance, 
or any other thing of value provided under a state or 
federally funded benefit program to the extent that 
the person receiving the thing of value is not entitled 
to receive it or is not entitled to receive it a t the level 
provided 
(11) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a pro-
vider under this title in connection with public assis-
tance, Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3, Public Support 
of Children, Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, Title 78, Chapter 45a, 
Uniform Act on Paternity, or any other publicly 
funded assistance benefit program to the extent that 
the provider receives payment 
(A) for goods or services not provided, or 
(B) in excess of the amount to which the pro-
vider is entitled 
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined 
in Section 62A-11-103 
(2) Each provider, client, or other person who receives an 
overpayment shall, regardless of fault, return the overpay-
ment or repay its value to the department immediately 
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment 
from the department, or 
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if tha t occurs 
prior to receiving notice 
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (3)(b), interest 
on the unreturned balance of the overpayment shall 
accrue at the rate of 10% a year until an administrative or 
judicial judgment is entered 
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person 
receiving it, that person is not liable for interest on the 
unreturned balance 
(c) In accordance with rules adopted by the depart-
ment an overpayment may be recovered through deduc-
tions from cash assistance, general assistance, food 
stamps, or other cash-related assistance provided to a 
client under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act 
(4) Each person who knowingly assists a client, provider, or 
other person in obtaining an overpayment is jointly and 
severally liable for the overpayment 
(5) (a) In proving liability for overpayment under this 
section or Subsection 62A-11-204 l(2)(a)(i) when fault is 
alleged the department shall prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the overpayment was obtained inten-
tionally, knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrep-
resentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent means, 
such as by committing any of the acts or omissions 
described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205 
(b) If fault is established under Subsection (5)(a), any 
person who obtained or helped another obtain an over-
payment shall be subject to 
(I) a civil penalty of 10% of the amount of the 
overpayment, and 
(II) disqualification from receiving public assis-
tance for 12 months for the first offense, 24 months 
for the second offense, and permanently for the third 
offense or as otherwise provided by federal law 
(6) (a) If an action is filed, the department may recover, in 
addition to the principal sum plus interest, reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs unless the repayment obligation 
arose from an administrative error by the division 
(b) Upon receipt, the department shall forward attor-
neys fees recovered under Subsection (6)(a) to the attor-
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When To Continue Assistance For a Recipient 
190-2 When To Continue Assistance For A Recipient 
1. When the action in question required advance notice, continue the 
financial assistance if the client asked for the hearing anytime before 
the effective date of the action or within 10 days of the notice mail 
date. 
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner will decide what the issues are. 
If he says the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or 
State policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time. 
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you receive the 
hearing decision. 
2. When the action in question did not require advance notice, the OFS 
Associate Director decides about continued assistance. If he says 
the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State policy 
or law, do not issue continued assistance. However, if he says that 
is not the only reason for the hearing, continue the financial 
assistance if the client asked for the hearing within 10 days of the 
notice mail date. You would then continue the financial assistance 
until you get the hearing decision. 
3. If you continue the financial assistance when the hearing is because 
the client does not agree with the amount of an overpayment, 
continue the grant minus the recovery amount. However, if you 
continue the financial assistance when the hearing is about whether 
or not an overpayment exists in the first place, reinstate the original 
grant amount. 
4. The client is not entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal 
of the initial hearing decision. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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Determination Of Employability 
362-3 Determination of Emplovabilitv 
A person must work less than 100 hours per month and must meet 
one of the following three criteria: 
1. Unemployable, OR 
2. "Marginally employable" as determined by the district 
director at his discretion, OR 
3. 60 years of age or older. 
362-3 
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Unemployable 
362-4 Unemployable 
The applicant must provide medical evidence* that he is not 
employable due to a physical or mental impairment. If the medical 
statement does not provide medical evidence, offer to help the 
client obtain medical evidence. Medical records or specialized 
medical evaluations may provide medical evidence. The local 
office has the responsibility to pay for medical exams to provide 
evidence needed to determine eligibility. The exams must be prior 
approved by the local office. The client is responsible for securing 
medical records, contacting a specialist if needed, and scheduling 
evaluations. 
The impairment must be so severe that the person cannot do his 
previous work. In addition, he could not reasonably hope to find 
any other kind of "substantial work" considering his age, education, 
and work experience. "Substantial work" is work which pays $500 
or more a month. 
If the applicant states he has a medical problem and cannot work, 
either accept the medical/psychological evidence the client may 
have or give him Form 20 Disability or Form 21 Medical Report to 
be completed and returned. Use Form 20 Disability, if the client 
might be eligible for D disability or SSI, or 
Medical Evidence: A client saying he has a medical problem does not constitute 
medical evidence. Medical evidence are signs and findings based on tests, x-rays, 
observation, and other medical procedures. Signs are anatomical, physiological or 
psychological abnormalities which can be observed with clinical techniques. For 
psychiatric impairments, signs are medically demonstrable abnormalities of behavior, 
affect, thought, memory, orientation and contact with reality. For example, a person 
saying they are depressed is not medical evidence. Participation in mental health 
programs, psychological tests, and observation of behavior are examples of medical 
evidence. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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840 Incorrect Payments 
An incorrect payment occurs when a person either: 
1. Receives a payment he is not eligible for, or 
2. Receives a payment he is eligible for but in the wrong amount. 
840-1 Causes of Incorrect Payments 
All overpayments must be referred to ORS no matter what the 
cause. However, ORS may treat the collection of an overpayment 
differently depending on its cause. For example, ORS can collect 
interest on an overpayment caused by intentional violation, but 
not on one caused by administrative error. 
1. Administrative Error 
Administrative errors are all mistakes made by state or local 
office staff in computing payments or eligibility. They 
include the local office or state staff: 
A. Delaying action on a reported change. 
B. Making a math error. 
C. Completing forms incorrectly. 
D. Applying policy incorrectly. 
2. Inadvertent Error 
Inadvertent errors are mistakes made by the client or his 
representative that are not intended. They include errors 
that result from: 
(Continued on next page) 
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Causes of Incorrect Payments 
A. Not understanding instructions and forgetfulness; 
B. A change that is reported more than 10 days after 
the change occurs by a client who had not received 
an explanation of the reporting requirements. 
3. Intentional Violation 
Intentional violations are deliberate breaches of program 
rules by the client or his representative. They include: 
A. Making false or misleading statements; 
B. Misrepresenting, concealing, or withholding facts; 
C. Posing as someone else; 
D. Not reporting the receipt of a financial assistance 
payment that the individual know her was not 
entitled to; 
E. Not reporting a change within 10 days after the 
change occurs, and the client knew they were 
supposed to report the change. 
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circumstances in the perticular case, an individual will be found 
to IKWC been at fault in connection \/ith ;ui overpayment when an 
incorrect payment resulted from one of tho following: 
(CL) Failure to furnish information which the individual 
knew or should have known was material; 
(b) An incorrect statement made by the individual which 
ho knew or should have Izr.ovn was incorrect (this includes 
the individual's furnishing his opinion or conclusion \/hcn 
he was asked for facts), or 
(c) The individual did not return a paynsnt which he knew 
or could have been expected to know was incorrect. 
Section lil6.553 Of Social Security Administration Regulations Ho, 16 provides in 
pertinent part, that recovery of an overpayment will defeat the purpose of title 
XVI of the Act if such recovery would deprive tho individual of income-or 
financial resources needed for ordinary end ncccsnnry living expenses. 
Section hl6.1336(c) of Regulations No, 16 provides, in pertinent port, that 
where advance written notice of intent to terminate payments is given, the 
notice will allow 60 days to request appropriate appellate review and if the 
appeal is requested within 10 days, the payment shall be continued until a 
decision on such appeal is issued. 
EVIDF31CK CONSIDFRKI) 
The Appeals Council has carefully considered the testimony at the hearing, the 
arguments made, and the exhibits of record. 
EVALUATION OF TIE FVIDFNCF 
The claimant, born on May 27, 1950, was converted from the California welfare 
rolls and began receiving supplemental security income as a disabled individual 
in January 197U. The Social Security Administration determined that the claimant 
no longer met the disability requirements and advised him on February 10, 1976* 
that his disability had ceased in November 197?, that he might Request a hearing 
within 60 days, and that if he wished his prior payments continued until a 
hearing decision wa3 made, lie had to request a hearing within 10 days. The 
claimant did so
 > requesting a hearing on February ?$ , 1/7^. Fie received monthly 
benefits under the' continuation of payment provision through July 1977. 
The final decision of the Secretary on the issue of th" cessation of the claimant's 
disability was the hearing decision dated September 29, 1977, finding that the 
claimant's disability had ended in November 19 (S «'u-* that supplemental security 
income payments should, and have been, terminated with the close of January 1976. 
The claimant requested the Appeals Council to review that decision and the Council 
denied his request on February 10, 197o. No civil action was filed. 
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On February 3, 1978, a Notice of Overpayment advised the claimant of the $5139.50 
overpayment and of his right to waiver if he was not at: fault and could not meet 
his current living expenses. A reconsideration determination dated August 10, 
1978, found that recovery could not be waived indicating, in pertinent part, that: 
A "with faultn determination, in this case, is not predicated on 
the fact that the recipient availed himself to (sic) the option to 
have payments continue through the pendancy (sic) of the appeal, but 
rather because he understood the cause of the overpayment (the fact 
that his eligibility ceased due to the cessation of his disabling 
condition), and his awareness of the consequences of his actions, 
and absent a showing to the contrary, under present administrative 
procedures, Mr. Vaughn cannot be found to be without fault in 
connection with the overpayment, and, as such, recovery of the 
overpaid anount is required. 
The administrative law judge's rationale in finding the claimant not without fault 
was that the claimant understood from the notice he hid received that he might 
have to repay if he lost his appeal; that he knew that the Administration had 
found him no longer disabled; that, irrespective of his own opinion about his 
disability, he knew he was receiving benefits under the risk of repayment; and 
that he was capable of appreciating the difference between receiving benefits 
when found disabled and receiving benefits after die Aiiministraticn found his 
disability had ended. 
After careful consideration of the issue presented in this case, the Appeals 
Council is of the opinion that where an overpayment occurs as the result of the 
continuation of payment provisions of section 416.1336(c), a finding of without 
fault may still be made if there is no evidence establishing that the recipient-
did not believe he properly deserved the incorrect payment. Tne mere fact that 
a claimant signed a statement acknowledging possible liability for overpayment 
would not be dispositive of the issue. 
In the instant case, the entire overpayment resulted Iran the continuation of 
payment provision exercised by the claimant as his due process right under 
the regulations. Although the claimant may well have understood that the 
Ajdministration no longer considered him disabled and that he could ultimately 
lose on appeal, it is evident from the record that he honestly believed he was 
disabled and properly deserved the payments trade after January 1976. 
Therefore, the mere fact that a claimant realizes ho received an adverse disability 
determination and that he might ultimately lose hi.:; appeal and be overpaid is not 
determinative of the without fault issue. The kev factor is the claimant's 
belief that he was disabled and that he properly deserved the payment. The record 
in this case fully supports the claimant's good faith belief in his own disabled 
condition and his honest belief that he properly deserved the payment. Tne fact 
that he availed himself of the coiitinued payment procedures under the regulations 
cannot Impute fault to him. 
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Moreover, it is clear under section 416.552 of the regulations that the claimant 
did not fail to furnish information, did not irake any incorrect statement or 
fail to return any payment which he knew was inroivct . Accordingly, he is not 
at fault under section 416.552. 
The Appeals Council is of the opinion, and finds, that the claimant was without 
fault in connection with the $5139.50 overpayment for February 1976 through July 
1977. In addition, it is evident from the record that the claimant has not had 
appreciable savings in the past few years and required all of his income for his 
ordinary and necessary living expenses. Accordingly, the Appeals Council finds 
that recovery of the $5139.50 overpayment would defeat the purpose of title XVI 
of the Social Security Act. 
DECISION 
The decis ion of the adminis t ra t ive law judge i s reversed . I t is the decision 
of the Appeals Council that recovery of the $5139.50 overpayment i s v^iived. 
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This case is before the Appeals Council on remand from the United States Cistr.ct 
Court for the Eastern District of California (Civil Action \ 'o . CV S-7Z-Wl-T3y). 
The Appeals Council vacates its denial of the claimant's requcvt for review of 
the hearing decision issued on March 11, 1977. 
The s ta tements of the administrat ive law judge as to tho pertinent provisions 
of the Social Security Act, the issues in the case, ana the evidentiary facts *hich 
were before him are incorporated herein by reference, iiowever, the Appeals 
Council does not adopt Lhe inferences, findings or conclusions of the administrative 
law judge on the ul t imate Lssue of the waiver or adjustment of recovery of the 
overpayment of supplemental security income. 
Social Security Regulations No, 16, Subpart E, section M6.35G provides that recovery 
of the overpayment is applicable if an Individual was without fault in connection 
with the overpayment and adjustment or recovery of tne overpayment v/oulo defeat 
the purpose of t i t le XVI. Regulations 416.552 and 416.553 contain the criteria 
for determining whether an individual was "without fault" and vhether waiver 
of adjustment or recovery of the overpayment wouH defeat t ie purpose of title 
xvi. 
After careful consideration of all the evidence of record, the Appeals C c r o l 
finds that the claimant was without fault in connection with the overpayment 
of supplemental security income benefits because tne c v i c n c c co*2S not cstaolisi. 
that the claimant knew or could have been expected to Lno\ that tne b o ^ f i t 
oayments she elected to receive pending th^ hearing . o ^io » or the dis >i!'ty 
issue were improper. In fact, the record reveals t^ n t t i~ cw ;rr ?nt cloa, 1/ >ol:o». ' 
that she was co tmed xo tne incorrect oayments. "!• " oi, *ol I'SO n i - ' : 
or recovery of the overpayment would defeat the o n » w . f : tic > v'i. 
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The decblon of the administrative law judge Issued on January 27, 1978, is reversed. 
It is the decision of the Appeals Council that the overpayment of supplemental 
security income to the claimant during the period November 1976 through March 
1977 b waived. 
APPEALS COUNCIL 
Mrwin Friedcnberg, Member ~^~" 
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Edwin C- Satter, IH, Member 
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